European Law – Implementing EC directives on consumer protection – short-term choices by the UK by Weatherill, Stephen
European Law
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by Professor Stephen Weatherill
The practical details of the implementation of EC directives are largely left for elaboration 
within the domestic system of the 
member states. According to art. 189 of 
the EC Treaty, a directive: 
'shall be binding, as to the result to be 
achieved, upon each member state to which it 
is addressed, but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods.'
'BOLTING ON' LEGISLATION
The European Court has typically been 
unwilling to make significant inroads into 
the broad discretion allowed to the 
member states in selecting methods of 
implementation, contenting itself with 
the frequently repeated observation that 
the member states shall put in place 
'effective' means of securing theo
objectives mapped out in EC directives. 
There is an appealing division of function 
inherent in the notion of the directive as 
an EC legal act. The Community sketches
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the broad objective; the member states 
choose the method of implementation 
which best suits their established 
institutional and legal traditions. 
Directives will not have the same detailed 
impact state by state; but they ought to be 
absorbed into the tried-and-trusted 
administrative structures of the states, 
fastening on to what already exists.
However two recent examples of UK 
practice in implementing EC directives 
on consumer protection illustrate the 
weaknesses of the process. In both 
instances, the UK has simply 'bolted on' 
implementing legislation to a pre-existing 
structure of legal protection. The 
advantage of eschewing consolidation is 
speed but this is exceeded by the 
disadvantage of intransparency. The 
lesson which ought to be grasped is that 
enduringly successful domestic 
implementation of EC law involves far 
more than the simple one-shot paper 
transposition on which focus is usually 
directed.
UNFAIR TERMS
Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in 
consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L95/29) 
was implemented in the UK by the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1994 (SI 1994/3159). These 
regulations came into force six months 
after the deadline but the major 
objection goes beyond tardiness. No 
attempt was made to integrate the new 
regime drawn from the directive with the 
pre-existing system of control under 
(primarily) the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977 ('UCTA 1977') - so both co-exist.
The new regime instituted by the 
1994 regulations is broader than UCTA 
1977 in that it is capable of catching all 
types of contractual term, in contrast to 
UCTA which is restricted to terms that 
exclude or restrict liability (or similar   
UCTA s. 13). The 1994 regulations are 
also broader in that they are capable of 
affecting some contracts which are 
excluded from the reach of UCTA, most 
notably insurance contracts. On the 
other hand, the 1994 regulations affect 
only consumer contracts, while UCTA 
touches (some) commercial contracts; 
and the 1994 regulations control only- 
terms that have not been individually 
negotiated, a restriction not found in 
UCTA.
So understanding the state of the law 
now depends on a careful reading of two 
separate texts. It can be firmly stated 
that, where the new regime offers more 
extensive protection than UCTA, it adds 
to the scope of consumer protection in 
the UK; and, where the old regime is 
more extensive, it remains in place 
because Directive 93/13, as a minimum 
measure, does not pre-empt the 
introduction or maintenance of stricter 
national rules. But the law is now 
intransparent, which is a weakness of 
especial consequence in the consumer 
field. Consumer law needs to be clear if 
it is to be used   by consumers and by 
their legal advisers.
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TIMESHARE
The choices made in implementing the 
EC's 1994 timeshare directive, Directive 
94/47 (OJ 1994 L280/83) are more 
disturbing. The UK has transposed the 
timeshare directive into domestic law by 
a single piece of secondary legislation, the 
Timeshare Regulations 1997 (SI 1997/1081), 
which came into force on 29 April 1997. 
The same problem confronted the UK in 
relation to this directive as had already 
been encountered in relation to 
Directive 93/13, in that the directive 
covered some ground already affected by 
a pre-existing UK measure, in this 
instance the Timeshare Act 1992. The 
Timeshare Act 1992 was passed in response 
to the perceived problem that unwary 
consumers had been lured into contracts 
by skilled, high-pressure sellers and it 
included provision for a post-agreement 
'cooling-off ' period. The EC directive is 
similarly motivated, though with the 
added veneer that it aims at 
harmonisation of lawrs, but goes further 
in the direction of mandatory 
information disclosure (touching matters 
such as the nature of the property, the 
price and recurring costs and charges) 
and includes more extensive protection 
in the event of failure to meet those 
standards, including a longer cooling-off 
period.
INTRANSPARENCY
The advantage of eschewing consolidation is 
speed but this is exceeded by the disadvantage 
of intransparency. The lesson which ought to 
be grasped is that enduringly successful 
domestic implementation of EC law involves 
far more than the simple one-shot paper 
transposition on which focus is usually 
directed.
Once again, the solution chosen in the 
UK has been to implement the directive 
via statutory instrument to operate 
alongside the existing statute, instead of
11
12
seeking to consolidate the law. But, 
whereas the two measures dealing with 
unfair terms do not formally inter-relate, 
the Timeshare Regulations 1997 cross-refer 
throughout to the Timeshare Act 1992. 
They amend stated sections of the 1992 
statute and insert relevant new material 
into it. So whereas the 1994 regulations 
on unfair terms are comprehensible in 
their own right, but do not offer a complete 
statement of domestic law because of the 
lurking presence of UCTA 1997, the 
regulations on timeshare are unintelligible 
on their own and must be painstakingly 
fitted together with the Timeshare Act 1992.
EFFECT OF NON- 
CONSOLIDATION
Admittedly, the ultimate conclusion 
seems to be that the UK has not made 
errors in the detail of the law; the 1997 
regulations accurately implement the 
directive by extending requirements of 
information disclosure and they provide 
for both civil and criminal consequences 
in the event of breach. And yet the 
exertions which await anyone attempting 
to ascertain the precise scope of his or 
her legal rights in timeshare dealing are 
so severe that, even though the scope of 
protection has been widened, it is 
impossible to regard this as satisfactory 
consumer protection law.
DANGER FOR CONSUMERS
The UK's predilection for short-term, bolt- 
on implementation is damaging to effective 
consumer protection. Lawyers may be 
accustomed to the practice of law reform 
through bolt-on statutory instruments but 
consumers are not. For consumer protection 
law, in particular, laws that are hard to 
understand tend to be laws that are not used 
(much) in practice. Consumer law needs to 
be simple to be effective but bolt-on 
transposition imperils pursuit of this 
objective.
The duration of the 'cooling off
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period provides an example. A consumer 
wants to know how long he or she has to 
change his or her mind about an 
agreement to buy timeshare. It is a simple 
question but not one susceptible to a 
simple answer. The EC directive requires 
a minimum ten-day cooling off period, 
but this is already exceeded by the 
Timeshare Act 1992, which offers the 
consumer 14 days. The EC directive, as a 
measure of minimum harmonisation, 
does not pre-empt stricter rules, and 
accordingly UK consumers continue to
enjoy a 14-day window of opportunity 
within which they may cancel   although 
they need to remember that the same 
level of protection is not necessarily 
available should they buy outside the UK 
(what price harmonisation?).
Reflecting the directive's 
requirements, a new s. 5A is inserted into 
the Timeshare Act 1992. This extends the 
right to cancel where defined 
information has not been supplied to the 
consumer. If the agreement does not 
include, as terms set out in it, the 
information referred to in specified 
paragraphs of Schedule 1 to the Act, then 
the agreement mav not be enforced
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against the consumer until the expiry of a 
period of three months and ten days, 
beginning with the day on which the 
agreement was entered into; and the 
consumer may cancel at any time during 
that period. The information, now found 
in Schedule 1, covers the detail required 
by the directive. If the relevant 
information is provided before three 
months have elapsed from the date of 
entry into the agreement, then the 
consumer has a ten-day period within 
which to cancel, beginning with the day 
on which information is received.
So, in the UK, the cooling off period 
may last anything between 14 days and 
three months plus ten days. The 1997 
regulations have, in principle, extended 
the scope of consumer protection; but in 
doing so they have rendered the 
protective regime a great deal less 
intelligible to the consumer. Most 
consumer disputes are resolved without 
recourse to law, and it is far from clear 
that the consumer 'negotiating' with a 
trader is better served by generous rules 
that are hard to grasp than by less 
generous rules which are readily 
understood.
EUROPEANISATION
The debate about the impact of the EC 
directives on consumer protection draws 
in fascinating academic questions about 
the capacity of the English legal system to 
absorb influences from continental 
Europe. In particular, a large amount of 
attention has been devoted to the 
implications of the entry into English law 
via the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1994 of the concept of good 
faith, which forms part of the assessment 
of unfairness under Directive 93/13. 
Good faith has never played an explicit 
role in general English contract law
(although for a judicial suggestion that 
English law employs legal techniques 
bearing different labels which may steer it 
towards results close to those reached by 
systems containing a requirement of 
good faith, see Bingham LJ (as he then 
was) in Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto 
Visual Programmes Ltd ( 1988) 2 WLR 615).
Probably the unfairness/good faith 
control test under the regulations will be 
applied in a comparable manner to that 
of reasonableness, familiar under UCTA 
1977. However even though litigation is 
likely to be relatively small-scale and 
typically inapt for involvement of the 
court in Luxembourg, the prospect of 
Europeanisation of such concepts 
through the fertile channel of art. 177's
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preliminary reference procedure cannot 
be discounted. For this reason the 
Department of Trade and Industry was 
wise to correct the bland comment made 
in its first consultation document of 
October 1993 on the implementation of 
the directive that reasonableness under 
UCTA and unfairness under the directive 
were essentially similar. It adopted a 
more cautious formula in its consultation 
document of September 1994, saying 
that the test drawn from the directive:
'is likely in most cases to lead to a result 
very similar to that oj the test of 
reasonableness in the Act, but the two tests 
are not the same.'
WIDER QUESTIONS
Regulatory techniques found in EC 
consumer protection directives   such as 
mandatory pre-agreement information 
disclosure and post-agreement rights to 
withdraw   combine with the accretion of 
similarly motivated domestic interventions 
into the old laissez-faire notions of 
contract law rooted in the concept of 
freedom of contract. These trends ask 
some provocative questions about the 
fragmentation of the law of contract into a 
law of contracts. To what extent is there 
(and should there be) a consumer contract 
law separate from the general trends of 
commercial contract law, responding to 
consumer disadvantages flowing from 
potential inefficiencies and unfairness in 
the operation of the market? Viewed from 
this perspective, the EC interventions may 
fairly be criticised for their rather 
piecemeal approach to consumer 
protection, a problem which has its chief 
source in the constitutional linkage of the
O
EC directives to internal market policy 
under art. 100 and, since the Single
European Act came into force in 1987, art. 
lOOa.
But, in any system, the law of 
consumer protection is a notoriously 
fuzzy-edged category, drawing in public 
and private law. It does not seem to me to 
be plausible to blame the EU for 
disrupting the unity of contract law. Over 
the course of this century, a series of 
adjustments, statutory and common law 
in source, have shaped not only 
consumer contract law but also, for 
example, employment contract law and 
landlord-and-tenant contract law as 
distinct sub-species of contract law. EC- 
derived regulatory techniques such as 
pre-contractual intervention to secure 
information disclosure and post- 
agreement opportunities to withdraw 
from a deal may depart from rules of 
contract formation inspired by the 
principle of caveat emptor, in that they 
do not simply expect parties to rely on 
their own wits to wrest favourable terms; 
but such departure is today far from 
uncommon in the UK across a whole 
range of contracts.
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THE BROADER DEBATES 
OBSCURED
But UK implementation practice 
obscures these debates about the 
prospects for, and the desirability of, 
firstly, Europeanisation of law and, 
secondly, the fragmentation of the law of 
contract. The reluctance to commit 
resources to consolidation impedes the 
structuring of a rational pattern. And, yet 
more concretely, the UK's predilection 
for short-term, bolt-on implementation 
is damaging to effective consumer 
protection. Lawyers may be accustomed 
to the practice of law reform through 
bolt-on statutory instruments but 
consumers are not. For consumer 
protection law, in particular, laws that are 
hard to understand tend to be laws that 
are not used (much) in practice. 
Consumer law needs to be simple to be 
effective but bolt-on transposition 
imperils pursuit of this objective. The 
Department of Trade and Industry 
produced a colourful booklet in the 
spring of 1997 under the title The 
Timeshare Guide which offers a summary 
of the law and even invites consumers to 
acquire a consolidated text from the DTI. 
This is a worthy attempt to make the best 
of a bad job. But the damage had already 
been done by the failure to achieve 
consolidation at a formal level.
EFFECTIVE 
IMPLEMENTATION'S 
WIDER SIGNIFICANCE
I would go further than my 
observation that the UK's 
implementation of the unfair terms 
directive and, a fortiori, the timeshare 
directive has created a complicated and 
intransparent system that is hard for 
consumers (or their advisers) to 
comprehend. An examination of the 
morass of cross-referencing in the 
Timeshare Regulations 1997 and the detail 
of exclusions/provisos (which I have by 
no means portrayed in their full intricacy 
in this broad brush account) persuades 
me that, even though the text of the 
regulations is not in itself an inaccurate 
representation of the timeshare directive, 
the UK has fallen short of the standard 
required by EC law in the way the 
directive is implemented. For example, 
in EC Commission v Federal Republic of 
Germany (Case C-96/95), judgment of 20 
March 1997, not yet reported, the 
European Court referred to the 
obligation on transposition to:
'guarantee the full application ofthe 
directive in a sufficiently clear and precise 
manner so that, where the directive is intended 
to create rightsJbr individuals, the persons 
concerned can ascertain the full extent of their 
rights and, where appropriate, rely on them 
before the national courts.'
I do not think that standard is met in 
the case of the UK's transposition of the 
timeshare directive.
It is perhaps inevitable that both the 
Commission and the member states have 
a tendency to measure implementation 
practice by reference to the easy-to- 
monitor phenomenon of paper 
transposition. Either an implementing 
measure has been communicated to the 
Commission by the deadline stipulated in 
the directive or it has not. The 
Commission has a yes-or-no answer from 
the member states and the member states 
need not pursue the time-consuming job 
of consolidation of laws if they prefer to 
allocate scarce resources elsewhere. In 
this way the Commission's league tables 
are constructed. Neither the 
Commission nor the member states have 
any obvious short-term incentive to take 
the matter on to a deeper plane. But the 
effective absorption of EC norms into the 
administrative and legal culture of the
o
member states demands a far more 
sophisticated awareness of the process of
implementation than is apparent in the 
notorious league tables. For the UK, the 
EC-derived rules on both unfair terms 
and timeshare are likely to permeate 
national legal consciousness only very 
slowly - because of the superficiality of 
the implementation process. The evasion 
of consolidation leaves a gulf between the 
law on paper and the law in practice 
which is especially damaging in the field 
of consumer protection.
LONG TERM DANGERS
More generally, a deeper appreciation 
of implementation trends is likely to 
become increasingly vital as the 
Community pursues the path of 
enlargement. As states with less well- 
developed administrative infrastructures 
seek to join the Community, it is all the 
more plausible that obligations 
undertaken on paper in the realms of, for 
example, environmental and consumer 
protection will have inadequate 
counterparts in practice. There is a risk 
that the process of implementation will 
become a sham unless more intensive 
possibilities evolve whereby there is an 
interrogation of the practical steps taken 
at national level to secure the meaningful 
application of Community law.
The distrust that failure   or suspected 
failure   to put in place relevant laws and 
administrative agencies is likely to 
generate among the member states is
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potentially damaging to the very integrity 
of the Community system. For this 
reason one can only applaud the choice 
of 'making the rules more effective' as
o
the first of four strategic targets set out in
o to
the Action Plan for the Single Market 
communicated by the Commission to the 
European Council in Amsterdam in June 
1997. And yet this can only become 
reality if the member states take seriously 
their obligations under art. 189 of the 
Treaty of Rome, instead of simply abusing 
the flexibility allowed by that provision by 
contenting themselves with short-term 
implementation choices. ®
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